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While a great deal of  theoretical work and a number of empirical pieces have 
dealt with the determinants of  U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in the rest 
of the world, very little is known about direct investment by foreign countries 
in the United States.’ My purpose in the present study is to partially redress 
that  imbalance.  I  establish  at the outset that, whereas  U.S.  foreign  direct 
investment abroad  is concentrated  in manufacturing  and petroleum, foreign 
investment  in  the  United  States  is  diversified  across  all  sectors  of  the 
economy. In addition, I provide evidence that differences in relative growth in 
GNP across countries and movements  in currency exchange rates affect the 
magnitude and timing of foreign direct investments in the United States. 
In this paper, I develop a simple partial equilibrium model of foreign direct 
investment in the manufacturing sector that focuses on how contracting costs 
influence parent firms’ decisions to invest in or to license foreign firms. The 
model suggests that high contracting costs are associated with goods that use 
firm-specific  human  and  physical  capital  inputs  and  require  substantial 
research and development effort in production. While this argument is hardly 
new or uncommon,2  the simplicity of my contracting model and the uniqueness 
of the empirical work that follows from it represent novel contributions to the 
basic approach. 
I  also consider the  relation  between  foreign  firms’  investments  in  the 
manufacturing  sector of the U.S. economy and protectionism  in the United 
States. Specifically, 1 test whether U.S. tariffs or nontariff trade barriers have 
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encouraged foreign firms investing in the United States either to circumvent 
existing  trade  restrictions  or to  neutralize  the  risk  of  future  protectionist 
measures.'  Furthermore, I  attempt  to determine the  effect of  intraindustry 
trade on foreign firms'  decisions to invest in the United States. 
The data consist of the values of  transactions that occurred within a given 
industry  summed  to  provide  an  industry-level  value  of  investments  at  the 
four-digit SIC level for each year from 1979 to 1985. By pooling time-series 
and cross-sectional data, samples are generated that are on the order of  1,800 
observations for manufacturing industries. The industry-level investment data 
are grouped according to the home of  the parent firm and separate estimates 
provided of  foreign direct investment in the United States for Japan, Canada, 
and the European Community (EC) as well as for all countries combined. 
The paper  has  several  important policy  implications.  First,  it  provides 
evidence that recent changes in exchange rates and relative economic growth 
across industrialized economies have played a role in promoting foreign direct 
investment  in the United States. Second, it clarifies the extent to which  the 
recent rise in nontariff trade barrier protection in the United States has induced 
greater  foreign  investment  in  U.S.  manufacturing  activities.  Finally,  it 
provides evidence regarding the extent to which foreign direct investment  in 
the  United  States  might  create  the  jobs  needed  to  reduce  the  structural 
unemployment problems that were apparent in the United States in  1979 and 
1980. 
2.1  Background 
While most previous work on foreign direct investment has focused on the 
manufacturing  sector,  we  need  to have  some perspective  on  the  role  that 
foreign investment has played in the nonmanufacturing  sector. In addition to 
assessing the characteristics of overall foreign investment in the United States, 
we also need to examine the components of that investment. Therefore, I will 
review both  overall foreign investment  in the United States and the relative 
importance  of  foreign direct  investment  in  the United  States originating  in 
Japan, the EC, and Canada. 
Table 2.1 provides a summary  of  foreign direct  investment  in the United 
States for each year from 1979 to 1985. The data include annual investments 
in all sectors and in manufacturing by firms from Japan, the EC, Canada, and 
the rest  of the world. For the period as a whole, manufacturing  investment 
accounted for only 33.4 percent of  the total foreign direct investment in the 
United States. Together, Japan, Canada, and the EC accounted for 79 percent 
of  all  foreign  direct  investment  and  80.5 percent  of  total  manufacturing 
foreign direct investment in the United  States between  1979 and  1985. 
Table 2.2 provides a summary of the largest foreign direct investments  in 
manufacturing in the United States between  1979 and 1985 for foreign firms 
in general and by  firms from Japan, Canada, and the EC. Table 2.3 indicates 55  Determinants of  Foreign Direct Investment 
Table 2.1  Foreign Direct Investment Comparisons (billions of U.S. dollars) 
Year  World  Japan 
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All  Manufacturing  All  Manufacturing 
3.265  I .096 
4.234  1.022 
12.369  4.187 
4.659  ,890 
4.029  ,698 
5.451  1.122 
2.577  ,685 
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12.339  3.880 
8.288  3.139 
11.841  3.119 
8.297  2.846 
6.739  2.531 
17.531  4.901 








Joint Totals (Canada, EC, and Japan)  Joint Shares (Canada, EC, and Japan) 
All  Manufacturing  All"  Manufacturing a 
16.327  5.531  90.8  86.7 
13.785  4.859  85.6  87.5 
25.720  8.185  80.7  88.4 
14.702  4.213  83.0  94.7 
12.994  3.957  67.0  92.3 
33.442  9.746  77.7  69.1 
15.063  7.918  71.5  67.2 
Note:  Percentages are given in parentheses. 
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Table 2.2  Top Foreign Direct Investment Transactions in U.S. Manufacturing 
Industries (millions of  US.  dollars) 
~~  ~~  ~ 
SIC  Description  All  Japan  Canada  EC 
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55,811.6  8,611.9  9,700.4  26,096.5 
Nore:  NEC  = not elsewhere considered 
"Except building paper. 
bAnd steel mills. 
'And  plate and foils. 
dMetal cutting types. 
'And  fans. 
the values and sources of the largest foreign direct investments in the United 
States  during  the  period  1979-85  and  shows  the  relative  importance of 
investments made by Japanese, Canadian, and EC firms. The ten largest EC 
firm investments are among the top twenty investments that were undertaken 
during the period.  In contrast, the second through the tenth largest Japanese 57  Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment 
Table 2.3  Top  Foreign Direct Investment Transactions (all industries in  millions of 
U.S. dollars) 
Country of  Origin 
SIC  Transaction 
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“The investment was not identified 
investments ranked between forty-seventh and one hundred eleventh overall. 
The second through the tenth largest Canadian investments  ranked between 
twentieth and forty-second overall. 
As we pursue the relevance of  previous theoretical and empirical work to 
U.S. experience, it is worth remembering  that  in-bound  investment  is not 58  Edward John Ray 
concentrated  in  manufacturing.  It is  also worth noting  that, for the  period 
under  consideration, the  share of  foreign  direct  investment  in  the  United 
States originating in the EC was 44.9 percent while the shares originating in 
Canada and Japan were 21.9 percent and  12.2 percent respectively. 
2.2  Contract Costs and Foreign Direct Investment 
This section provides a partial analysis of the decision to undertake foreign 
direct  investment  that  focuses  on  how  contracting  costs  influence  direct 
investment decisions. Specifically, I begin with the assumption that a firm has 
decided to enter a foreign market directly rather than rely on exports. Given 
that decision, the firm must then decide whether to enter that market through 
an  affiliate  or through  a  licensee. The process  of  explaining  how  a  firm 
chooses between  direct  investment  and  licensing  provides  insight  into firm 
and market characteristics that are conducive to foreign direct investment. 
While my focus here is on the decision-making process of a single firm, that 
process can be placed  in context by assuming that the market setting within 
which the investment decision is made is that of a firm producing a differen- 
tiated product in an industry characterized by Chamberlinian-type monopolistic 
competition.  Assuming either Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) or Lancaster (1979) type 
preferences for the differentiated goods by consumers abroad will permit US to 
derive foreign market demand curves for the product of each firm, including 
our single producer. 
In  simplest  terms,  the  choice  between  foreign  direct  investment  and 
licensing of a foreign firm will depend on the expected present value of  the 
discounted  profit  stream  accruing  to the  firm  from  investing  compared to 
licensing.  Empirical evidence on U.S. direct investment abroad in manufac- 
turing and on foreign direct investment in manufacturing in the United States 
in recent years reflects a strong preference for majority-owned and, almost as 
often, wholly owned foreign subsidiaries rather than licensing arrangements 
to  take  advantage  of  opportunities  to  earn  profits  in  foreign   market^.^ 
Therefore, the  model  must  be  able to explain  market, production, and/or 
contracting conditions that generate a general preference for direct investment 
over  licensing  and  for  substantial  majority  control  when  foreign  direct 
investment takes place. 
2.2.1 
Let PF  and QF  represent the foreign price of  the product and the output by 
a  foreign  subsidiary  in  a  given  market  period.  In  addition,  assume  that 
production can be characterized as follows: 
Foreign Direct Investment versus Licensing 
where  LF and  KF are  basic  labor  and  capital  inputs  and  HF  and  K;  are 
specialized human and physical capital assets associated with the production 
of the firm’s differentiated product. The process of deciding whether to invest 59  Determinants of  Foreign Direct Investment 
or to license is essentially one of determining which method of operating in 
the foreign market will maximize the expected discounted  value of  appropri- 
able rents that  the  firm can  get  from  the  use  of  H, and K;.  The term  H,. 
represents managerial and marketing know-how as well as technical expertise 
that can be conveyed to the foreign subsidiary directly from the home office 
or provided to a licensing  firm through consulting  arrangements. 1 presume 
that the specialized capital inputs, K;.,  are constructed in the foreign country 
under the scrutiny of the parent firm or subject to contractual restraints in the 
case of  licensing.  Abstracting from issues of  production and/or consumption 
smoothing over time, I assume that all the current output is sold. 
Costs  in  each  production  period  include  factor  input  costs,  C,,  plus 
marketing costs associated with the foreign market, M,.  Marketing costs are 
assumed to be a positive and increasing function of  sales and of the degree of 
adaptation  that  the  firm  has  to  make  to  market  its  product  abroad,  d. 
Adaptation  could  include  anything  from  a  modest  differentiation  of  an 
existing product sold in the home market, in which case d would be small, to 
the development of totally unrelated products for sale abroad, in which case 
d would be large. I assume that d is a positive and increasing function of  the 
degree of  nonsubstitutability  between  parent firm and  subsidiary  firm prod- 
ucts. 
The profitability  of investment abroad at any point in time, nt,  is simply 
(2)  rTT,  = R,,  - C,,  -  MF, , 
where  R,,  represents  current  revenue  and  the  discounted  present  value  of 
expected  profits  from foreign  direct  investment  can be  written  as T,. The 
assumption that the firm is concerned only with the discounted present value 
of  its foreign operations presumes that the firm is risk neutral and that there 
are no bankruptcy risks. 
The alternative possibility  facing the firm would be to license the use of 
specialized  human  and  physical  assets  to  a  foreign  producer,  who  would 
provide royalty  payments to the firm in return for the use of  the specialized 
assets.  The returns  to  the  licensing  firm  will  be  equal to  the  value  of  the 
licensed  services  less  the  costs of  defining  and  enforcing  the  terms of  the 
contract. The value of the firm’s specialized assets in any period is equal to 
the sum of the implicit value of  specialized human and physical capital assets, 
wh  H,,  + r5&,  where wh  and r., are specialized asset prices per unit time. 
The cost of contracting  with the  licensee can be thought of as simply the 
sum of the costs of  monitoring and enforcing the terms of  the agreement by 
which the licensee has access to the use of the specialized human and physical 
capital  assets of  the  home-country  firm.  The licensing  firm incurs positive 
contracting  costs either because  there exists the possibility  of  opportunistic 
behavior by  the licensed firm in the use of  specialized assets or because it is 
difficult to assess the implicit value of the use of the specialized assets that are 
licensed.  I  assume that licensing contract costs, C,,  are positively related to 60  Edward John Rav 
the  use  of  both  kinds  of  specialized  assets and  to  the  ratio of  specialized 
physical capital to human capital required in production.  This last argument 
will  be  denoted  by  k,,  = K;.,  /HF,. Therefore,  the  value  of  the  licensing 
arrangement to the licensing firm, n,,,  in any period, should be equal to the 
net revenues accruing from licensing, 
(3)  nLr  = w,~H,, + r,K;.,  -  CL,WFl, GI,  kF,) , 
and the discounted present value of a licensing agreement to the licensing firm 
can be written as nL.  The firm  in  possession  of  the specialized  assets  will 
choose to invest abroad when 
(4) 
Therefore, the desire to  invest abroad rather than license a foreign producer 
will be positively related to licensing contracting costs and negatively related 
to the marketing costs of  the investing firm. 
To  this  point,  I  have  not  discussed  the  conditions  under  which  anyone 
would be interested in buying a license abroad. Assuming that marketing costs 
associated  with  selling  abroad,  MF, are  not  relevant  to  a  host-country 
produ~er,~  we can denote the discounted expected profitability  of a license to 
a buyer  as nB.  The profit  from licensing  a  firm  in  any  given  period, n,,, 
represents a cost to the licensee.  If contracting costs are high enough, it will 
never  pay  to  offer to  sell  licenses  abroad. If  licensing  costs, n,,  are high 
enough, it will never pay to purchase a license. In the case in which licensing 





ITl - nL  > 0. 
n1  - nL > 0, 
l-rB - nL  > 0. 
In effect,  the  likelihood  that  a  firm  will  choose to  invest  abroad,  and 
therefore  the  value of  foreign  direct  investment  within  an  industry  in  any 
given period of  time, will be negatively related to the cost of  marketing the 
product abroad and positively related to the costs of  defining and enforcing 
licensing  agreements  (i.e.,  contracting  costs). More formally,  the value of 
industry  investment abroad, FDI, can be written as a function of marketing 
and contracting costs as follows: 
where the inequality signs reflect the derivatives off(.) with respect to M, and 
C,.  Marketing  costs increase  as the  degree of  substitutability  between  the 
parent  firm’s  product  and the  subsidiary  firm’s product  decreases or as the 
diversity,  d, between  the  two  products  increases.  I  assume  that  product 61  Determinants of  Foreign Direct  Investment 
diversity and therefore M, will be smallest and FDI greatest when the foreign 
direct investment is in production in the same industry as the one in which the 
parent is already operating. In the empirical work in section 2.3 below, I use 
the  percentage  of  investment  within  an  industry  for which  the parent  and 
subsidiary firms have the same four-digit SIC code as a direct measure of the 
substitutability between parent and affiliate products. Therefore, I expect the 
within-parent  industry  index  to  be  positively  related  to  foreign  direct 
investment in the United States. 
Contracting  costs are  directly  related  to  the requirements  of  specialized 
human and physical capital inputs per unit of  output. In the empirical work 
that  follows,  I  use  the  research  and  development intensity  of  production 
(R&D) as an indicator  of  the  need  for  specialized  asset  inputs per  unit of 
output. 
I also assume that specialized asset values are more easily appropriable by 
the owner over time through licenses if  they are embodied in human capital 
than  if  they are embodied  in  physical  capital, which  can be disassembled, 
copied, and therefore stolen by a licensee.  Therefore, foreign direct invest- 
ment  would  be more  likely the  greater the  share of  physical  capital  in the 
specialized  asset  mix  of  the  parent  company.  Holding  scale  phenomena 
constant, as measured by midpoint plant shipments in an industry, MPS, I use 
the capital-labor ratio to measure the ratio of firm-specific specialized physical 
capital to specialized human capital. 
In the empirical  section, I  use  industry investment, which  is the sum of 
investment  decisions  across  representative  firms  in  our  monopolistically 
competitive  framework,  as  the  unit  of  analysis.  These  points  can  be 
summarized as follows: 
where the inequalities below the variables reflect the expected effect of each 
right-hand-side variable on the value of industry foreign direct investment. 
The analysis I have presented presumes that the parent firm behaves like a 
Chamberlinian monopolistic competitor in the foreign market. That assump- 
tion  permitted  me to focus  on  the  relative  attractiveness  of  licensing  and 
investing to the parent firm without regard to the choices made by producers 
of other variants of the product  and to think about industry behavior as the 
simple sum of  decisions  by  individually  and  independently  acting parent 
firms.  To  the  extent  that  the  market  is  dominated  by  a  few  firms  in 
oligopolistic  competition, the choices  facing  our single producer are much 
more complex. 
The original  Gruber,  Mehta,  and  Vernon  (1967) argument  that  foreign 
direct  investment  could  be  interpreted  as  a defensive  strategy  to  maintain 
market  shares abroad by  oligopolistic  producers  of  differentiated  consumer 
goods could lead to very different relations  among the key  variables  under 62  Edward .John Ray 
discussion  here.  I  include  a  consumer goods  measure and  a  measure  of 
industry concentration  in the estimated  investment  equations in section 2.3 
with the expectation  that  neither will  be positively  related to  foreign direct 
investment  decisions. Along  those  same lines, we  would  expect midpoint 
plant size within industries in which direct investment occurs to be insignif- 
icant, which is consistent with easy entry into the industry. 
The functional relation tested in the next section is based on the discussion 
here but includes consideration of  two other factors that tend to promote both 
foreign direct investment and licensing of foreign firms by a parent company. 
First,  I include a measure of  growth within individual industries as well as a 
measure of  growth  in the  foreign country  relative  to  growth  in the parent- 
company country. Finally, I assume that, given the decision to invest abroad, 
a firm will be more likely to time that investment when the foreign currency 
is cheap than when it is expensive. That timing makes sense only if a decline 
in the value of  the foreign currency is assumed to be temporary. 
2.3  Empirical Evidence 
While the regressions  summarized  in table 2.4 are directly related to the 
partial equilibrium model of  section 2.2, the empirical work summarized  in 
tables 2.5-2.8  below is more exploratory. Those results represent an effort to 
provide preliminary evidence of the relevance of  factors that were not part of 
the model but have been suggested in previous work as potentially important 
determinants of foreign direct investment activity. 
Referring to table 2.4, I proceeded with the analysis of firm-specific foreign 
direct investment activity in the context of a model of  monopolistic compe- 
tition.  A priori,  there  is no  reason  to presume  that  markets  are  not  highly 
concentrated and difficult to enter and that oligopolistic interactions are not at 
the  heart  of  an  explanation  of  foreign  direct  investment  decisions  in 
manufacturing.  The evidence  in table 2.4 indicates that in fact industries  in 
which  foreign  direct  investment  is  likely  to  occur  and  in  which  large 
transactions will be realized tend to be industries in which plant size is likely 
to  be  relatively  small  (except  for  Japan)  and  market  concentration  is 
insignificant  or a negative factor. In  addition, there  is no particular bias in 
foreign  direct  investment  activity  in  the  United  States  toward  consumer 
goods,  which  are  often  thought  of  as  possible  targets  for  oligopolistic 
competition. 
As expected, the value of foreign direct investment in the United States is 
positively related to whether the subsidiary is producing goods that belong to 
the  same four-digit  SIC category as those of  the parent  firm. That  relation 
reflects a minimum  of diversification between the parent and the subsidiary 
firms. 
I argued that  foreign direct investment would  be positively related to the 
research and development intensity of production and/or the capital-labor ratio 63  Determinants of  Foreign Dircct Investment 
holding plant size constant (reflecting the ratio of firm-specific physical capital 
to human  capital).  The research  and development  factor is  significant as a 
determinant of the value and likelihood of foreign direct investment from each 
area into the United States (except for Japan and Canada in terms of value). 
Foreign  direct  investment  in  the  United  States is  positively  related  to  the 
capital-labor ratio, holding plant  size constant, except in  the case of Japan 
(and Canada in terms of  likelihood). 
Industry-specific growth and relative growth in GNP in the United States 
were positively  related to  foreign direct investment  from each of  the major 
areas considered. Industry growth was significant with respect to the value of 
foreign  direct  investment  by  Japan and all  investors  as a  group.  Industry 
growth  was  significant  with  respect  to  the  likelihood  of  foreign  direct 
investment  in  the  United  States  for the  EC  and  for investors  in  general. 
Relative GNP growth  in the United States was significant in explaining the 
value of  Japanese and general investment. 
The exchange rate effect indicates that a relatively cheap U.S. dollar served 
as a significant stimulus to foreign direct  investment  into the United States 
from  each  of  the  major  investing  areas except Japan.  Such  opportunism 
presumes that a cheap U.S. dollar is a temporary phenomenon, which was not 
the case relative to the yen. 
The  regressions  also  include  industry  size  (the  log  value  of  industry 
shipments in the United States in 1982). That variable is intended to reflect the 
possible  significance  of  measurement  errors  associated  with  the  use  of 
industry rather  than  firm data to  explain  the  probability  and  magnitude of 
foreign direct investments.  As indicated in table 2.4, measurement problems 
may be relevant. 
The results  obtained  in  table  2.4  suggest  that  manufacturing  sectors  in 
which  foreign  direct  investment  has  been  significant  in  the  United  States 
during  the  early  1980s can  be  characterized  as  relatively  unconcentrated 
research- and specific-factor-intensive  industries.  There is no particular bias 
toward consumer or intermediate goods production and generally no evidence 
of scale economies in production, except in the case of Japanese investments. 
To the extent  that  individual  market expansion and  macroeconomic  factors 
have  influenced  foreign  decisions  to  undertake  direct  investments  in  the 
United  States,  they  have  worked  in  predictable  fashion.  Relative  real 
economic growth in the United States during the 1980s and industry-specific 
growth  encouraged  foreign  direct  investment  from abroad,  and  foreigners 
took  advantage  of  periods  when  the  U.S.  dollar was  relatively  cheap  to 
undertake U.S. investment projects. 
2.3.1 
Early efforts to explain the phenomenon of U.S. foreign direct investment 
around the world after World War 11 took two forms.6 On the one hand, it was 
Alternative Explanations of Foreign Direct Investment Table 2.4  Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Production Characteristics 
lndependent  Variables 
Midpoint  Capital-  Market  Within  No. of 
Dependent  Consumer  Plant  R&D  Labor  Concen-  Parent  Industry  Industry  U.S.  Growth  Exchange  Obser- 
Rate'  R2  vations  Variable  Constant  Goods"  Sizeb  Intensity'  Ratiod  tration'  Industry'  Sizeg  Growthh  Trend' 
Industry-level FDI: 
All countries  -  5.00 
(6.  15) 
Japan  -  2.16 
(1.66) 
EC  -4.39 
(10.26) 
Canada  -  6.69 
(4.54) 
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2.5 x 10-5 
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I.  I x 10-4 
.0001 
-  .01 
(2.49) 
-  ,001 
(.35) 
-  .01 
(2.21) 










.31  ,001 
(7.89)  (2.59) 
(3.22)  (1.68) 
.33  .001 
(7.38)  (4.00) 
.30  ,0002 
(4.47)  (.42) 










(2.02)  ,118  1,806 
-3.41 
(1.23)  ,353  1,806 
.01 
(2.28)  ,165  1,806 
.03 
(2.03)  .006  1.806 Probability of  industry-level FDI: 
All countries  -  7.50  .09 
(7.70)  (.75) 
(2.57)  (1.02) 
(11.02)  (1.32) 
(4.80)  (1.12) 
Japan  -3.64  .IS 
EC  -5.55  -.I7 
Canada  -7.23  -.21 
-  ,002 
(1.91) 
-  ,0003 
-  ,002 
(2.03) 

















9.3 x 10.’ 
(2.92) 
-  .006 
(2.50) 
-  ,002 
(.62) 
-  ,004 
(1.54) 









.41  ,001 
(8.63)  (2.52) 
.22  ,0004 
(3.21)  (.83) 
.43  .001 
(8.18)  (2.73) 
(4.69)  (1.30) 




(I  .29) 
.01 




(3.87)  ,409  1,806 
(.12)  ,481  1,806 
(4.64)  ,399  1,806 




Note:  The first four regressions in the table are estimated using tobit since the dependent variables are bounded below by 0.00 and there are a substantial number of 
limit observations. Each of the last four regressions is estimated using probit since the dependent variable is  a 1.0 or 0.0 dummy value, depending on whether there 
was any  investment  in  a given  industry in  a given year  in  the United  States.  Absolute  r-ratios appear  in  parentheses  below the coefficients.  Dependent  variable 
observations are at the four-digit industry level for each of the years  1979-85. 
aThis is a 1972 measure of  the proportion of industry sales for final consumption purposes. 
hMidpoint plant size is measured by  the midpoint plant shipment value for each industry using  1972 data. 
‘Research and development is measured by  the ratio of total research and development expenditures to total costs across industries in 1972 
dThe capital-labor ratio is the average value in  1972 for each industry 
‘This  is the industry four-firm concentration ratio in  1982. 
‘This is a constructed variable that represents the percentage of  individual investments within an  industry in a given year that are in the same four- digit SIC category 
as the parent firm’s four-digit SIC. 
”Industry  size is measured by  the log of the value of  industry shipments in  1982 
hIndustry growth is measured by  the percentage change in the value of shipments within each given four-digit SIC industry between  1972 and  1982. 
‘U.S. growth trend in the all industry regressions is measured by  real GNP changes in the current year. U.S. growth trends are measured by  real GNP growth in the 
United States relative to real GNP growth in Japan, the EC, and Canada for the corresponding regressions.  The measures are for the current year. 
’The exchange rate trend in the all industry regressions is measured by  the average of the U.S.  dollar/yen exchange rate during the current year. The EC and Canadian 
regressions use the deutsche mark and the Canadian dollar in place of the yen as appropriate in the exchange rate. 66  Edward John Ray 
presumed that the formation of the EC and the separate European free trade 
area in the early  1950s created trade barriers to U.S. exports to Europe that 
could  be  circumvented  by  the creation  of  U.S. production  subsidiaries  in 
Europe. On the other hand, it was argued that foreign direct investment might 
be one method by which producers in oligopolistic industries could maintain 
their market positions abroad as their exports became less competitive. This 
defensive investment hypothesis is most congenially identified with industries 
that  are  dominated  by  a  few  relatively  large  producers  of'  differentiated 
consumer products. 
The regressions reported in table 2.5 are intended to provide crude evidence 
on the applicability of the defensive investment hypothesis as an explanation 
of  recent foreign direct investment in the United States. As indicated, neither 
the likelihood nor the value of  foreign direct investments in the United States 
by industry was found to be positively related to market concentration (except 
the  value  of  foreign  direct  investment  for  Japan)  or  the  production  of 
consumer goods.'  That evidence does not exclude the possibility that a more 
complicated version of the defensive investment hypothesis can be sustained 
but it does shift the burden of proof to those who would argue that defensive 
investment strategies might explain foreign direct investment in U.S. manu- 
facturing industries. 
The argument  that  foreign  direct  investment  can  be  viewed  as  a  tariff- 
jumping technique has current appeal given the rise in protectionist sentiments 
in  the  United  States  since the  early  1970s. Furthermore,  a  literature  has 
developed  that  suggests  the use  of  foreign  direct  investment  to establish  a 
market  presence  within  a country  to prevent  future  trade  restrictions  from 
being implemented (see Wong 1987, and the references cited therein). 
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 report efforts to estimate the relation between tariff and 
nontariff trade barriers in the United States and decisions to undertake foreign 
direct investments in the United States. Recent studies suggest that the most 
highly protected industries in the United States enjoy both tariff and nontariff 
trade barrier protection (e.g., Marvel and Ray  1983; Ray and Marvel  1984; 
and the references cited in both). The interactive terms in tables 2.6 and 2.7 
reflect industries with high overall protection.  The issue is whether  foreign 
direct  investment  has been  induced  by  protectionist  measures.  The results 
presented in table 2.6 rely on the use of post-Tokyo  Round nominal tariff rates 
for 1986, while the estimates in table 2.7 are generated using post-Kennedy 
Round effective protective rates. The results in table 2.6, which are sustained 
in table 2.7, suggest that investments in the United States from abroad have 
not been stimulated by U.S. protectionism.  It is hoped that these preliminary 
results will inspire those who believe  in the importance of  strategic foreign 
direct investment to influence trade policy to attempt more systematic efforts 
in this direction. 
Recent  theoretical  and empirical  work  has  suggested  that  foreign  direct 
investment may either cause or be caused by  intraindustry  trade (see, e.g., Table 2.5  Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Defensive Investment 
Independent Variables 
Within 
Consumer  Market  Parent  Industry  U.S. Growth  Exchange  No. of 































-  .24 
(2.18) 
-  .30 
(1.65) 
-  .27 
(2.46) 
-  .07 
(.48) 
-  .27 
(2.23) 
-  .25 
(1.42) 




-  ,001 
-  ,004 
(1.62) 
~41) 




-  ,003 
(1.55) 


































































0.098  1,806 
0.290  1,806 
0.092  1,806 
0.003  1.806 
0.389  1,806 
0.472  1,806 
0.378  1,806 
0.207  1,806 
Nore: See notes to table 2.4. Table 2.6  Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Nominal Tariff and Nontariff Barrier (NTB) Jumping 
Independent  Variables 
Nominal  Within 
Nominal  Tariff-NTB  Parent  lndustry  U.S. Growth  Exchange  N~.  or 















(I  5.49) 
(4.61) 









-  6.84 
-  .01 
(.90) 
-  .01 
(.74) 
~  .01 
(34) 
-  .06 
(2.27) 
-  .01 
(.78) 




-  .06 
(2.22) 
-  .I2 
(1.16) 
-  .64 
(3.49) 
-  .22 
(I .96) 
-  .08 
(.49) 
-  .32 
(2.74) 
-  .55 
(2.86) 
-  .33 
(2.60) 
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.I3 
(.68) 
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,100  1.806 
.268  1,806 
,092  1,806 
,002  1,806 
.385  1,806 
,479  1.806 
,376  I  .806 
.203  1,806 
Nore:  See notes to table 2.4. 
”This measure equals post-Tokyo  Round,  1986, nominal tariff rates 
bNTBs are measured by a dummy variable that takes on a value of  1  .O if nontariff trade restrictions are present in an industry in the post-Kennedy  Round period and 
0.0 otherwise. 
“This is an interactive term reflecting the presence of both nominal tariff and NTB protection across industries in the post-Kennedy  Round period. While the interactive 
term uses post-Kennedy  Round NTB protection out of necessity, the term would accurately reflect high tariff and NTB-protected  industries in the post-Tokyo Round 
period too except for those cases of high tariff industries that would have received NTB protection for the first time after 1975. There are few if any likely cases among 
the 327 four-digit SIC industries. Table 2.1  Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Effective Tariff and Nontariff Barrier (NTB) Jumping 
Independent Variables 
Effective  Within  U.S. 
Effective  Tariff-NTB  Parent  Industry  Growth  Exchange  No.  of 
Dependent Variable  Constant  Tariff"  NTBs  Interactionb  Industry  Size  Trend  Rate  RZ  Observations 










-5.63  ,003 
-  3.50  .01 
(2.78)  (.63) 
-5.30  .01 
(15.38)  (2.21) 
-6.30  -.01 
(4.59)  (1.05) 
(7.18)  ~52) 
-7.89  .01 
(8.46)  (1.06) 
-4.14  .01 
(3.07)  (1.13) 
-6.09  .01 
(14.66)  (2.50) 
-6.83  -.01 
(4.85)  (1.00) 
,003 
(.03) 




























































































Notes:  See notes to tables 2.4 and 2.6. 
aEffective protection is measured by U.S. post-Kennedy  Round effective protection rates at the four-digit level. 
'"This is an interactive term that reflects the presence of both effective protection and NTBs in an industry. 70  Edward John Ray 
Ethier  1986; Helpman  1984; and Marvel and Ray  1987). Table 2.8 contains 
estimated relations that treat intraindustry trade in  1972 as a determinant  of 
foreign direct  investment  in the United  States between  1979 and  1985. In 
brief,  there is no evidence that the existence of  intraindustry  trade wit"'  llin a 
manufacturing  sector  serves  as  an  inducement  for  future  foreign  direct 
investment in that industry. 
2.4  Conclusions 
The evidence  presented  in  this  study  makes  it. clear  that  foreign  direct 
investments  in  the  United  States  in  recent  years  have  been  much  less 
concentrated in the manufacturing sector than was true of  U.S. foreign direct 
investments in the rest of  the world during the first three decades after World 
War  11.  Investments  in  manufacturing  in  the  United  States  have  been 
predominantly  from Canada, Europe, and Japan. Those industries that have 
attracted the most  interest and  investment  inflows  from foreign  firms were 
both consumer and producer goods manufacturers.  Neither scale economies 
nor  market  concentration  is  significant  in  general  in  investment  target 
industries.  But  affiliate  production  is  intensive  in  the  use  of  firm-specific 
human  and physical  capital, reflecting  the difficulties of contracting  for the 
use  of  such  factors  through  arm's-length  licensing  contracts.  Parent  and 
subsidiary firms tend to produce similar products, reflecting the tendency to 
create subsidiaries abroad to produce goods with which the parent firms are 
already most familiar. 
Relative  gains  in  real  economic growth  in  the  United  States  as  well  as 
industry-specific growth appear to have had some positive effect on decisions 
to invest in the United States by foreign firms, and investments appear to have 
been timed to take advantage of a relatively cheap U.S. dollar when possible. 
There  is  no  clear  evidence in  this  study  to  support  either  the  defensive 
investment hypothesis or the tariff-jumping  argument. 
This last  observation  is  consistent  with  the  view  that  foreign  investors 
were  no  more  interested  than  domestic  investors  were  in  putting  money 
into declining  industries in the United  States, which traditionally have been 
the  major  beneficiaries  of  protectionist  measures.  The  much-needed 
structural shifts in manufacturing  in the United States that began  in the late 
1970s were  reenforced  by  a  massive  inflow  of  capital  from  abroad.  The 
structural  unemployment  problems  that  developed  as  a  by-product  of 
market shifts during the early  1980s were  not offset  by  an inflow of  direct 
investment  funds  from  abroad  into  declining  industries.  Rather,  foreign 
direct  investments  in  the  United  States  appear to  have  contributed  to the 
expansion  of  existing  industries  and the  creation  of  newer  ones that  have 
provided new jobs. Table 2.8  Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Intraindustry Trade Effects 
Independent Variables 
Within  U.S. 
Intraindustry  Parent  Industry  Growth  Exchange  No. of 
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Note:  See notes to table 2.4 
"Intraindustry trade is measured using  1972 four-digit SIC data and consists of  an  index scaled from 0.0 to  100 percent with higher values 
corresponding to greater trade overlap. The precise measure used equals: 
(IMPORTS, EXPORTS) 
IMPORTS  + EXPORTS 
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Appendix 
Variable Sources and Dejinitions 
Dependent Variable Name  Description 
Industry-level foreign direct  Foreign direct investment into the United 
States by industry in millions of U.S. 
dollars. (Unless otherwise specified, the 
observations include those from the 469 
Manufacturing four-digit SIC codes.) 
Source: “Foreign  Direct Investment in 
the United States: Completed Transactions, 
1974- 1983 Volume 11:  Industry Sector” 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department  of 
Commerce, International  Trade 
Administration [ITA], June  1985). (Two 
additional years from the ITA on tape were 
also used.) 
investment 
Probability  of  industry  A dummy variable  that takes on the value 
one if  the value of the transactions by 
industry is greater than zero and zero 
otherwise. 
the United States.” 
foreign direct investment 
Source: “Foreign  Direct Investment in 
Independent Variable  Description 
Name 
U.S. growth trend: 
All country regressions  Annual real percentage change in the U.S. 
GNP from  1979 to  1985. 
Source: 1987 Economic Report of  the 
President (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office,  1987), table 
Ratio of  real U.S. GNP growth to Japanese 
real GNP growth from  1979 to  1985. 
Source: European Economv (Committee 
of  European  Communities).  no. 29, table 
8, p.  144. 
B-5, COI.  2, p. 251. 






EC regressions  Ratio of real U.S. GNP growth to an 
average of EC member countries’ real GNP 
growth from  1979 to  1985. 
Source: 1987 Economic Report of  the 
President, table B-106, p. 366; and 1981 
Economic Report of  the President 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1981), table B-107, 
Ratio of real U.S. GNP growth to the 
Canadian real GNP growth from 1979 to 
1985. 
Annual rate of  exchange between the U.S. 
dollar and the Japanese yen  ($/yen) from 
1979 to 1985. 
Source: I987 Economic Report of  the 
President, table B-105, p. 365. 
Annual rate of  exchange between the U.S. 
dollar and the Japanese yen  ($/yen) from 
1979 to  1985. 
Source: I987 Economic Report of  the 
President, table B-105, p. 365. 
Annual rate of  exchange between the U.  S. 
dollar and the West German mark ($/DM) 
from 1979 to  1985. 
Source: 1987 Economic Report of  the 
President, table B-105, p. 365. 
Annual rate of  exchange between the U.S. 
dollar and the Canadian dollar 
($US/$CAN) from 1979 to 1985. 
Source: 1987 Economic Report of  the 
President, table B-105, p. 365. 
Output attributed to personal consumption 
expenditures divided by  total output. 
Characteristics and Trade Pegormanre 
Data Bank (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
International Trade Commission [USITC], 
Office of Economic Research, June,  1975). 
The percentage of  sales accounted for by 
the four largest firms in an industry. 
Source: 1982 Census of  Manufactures. 
p. 353. 
Source: Same as EC regressions. 
All country regressions 
Source: USITC’s Industrial 
Market concentration 74  Edward John Ray 
Within parent industry 
Industry  size 
Nominal tariff 









Textiles industry dummy 
Intraindustry trade 
measure for 1972 
This is a dummy variable that takes on a 
value from 0 to  100 percent, reflecting the 
extent to which parent and affiliate firms 
have the same four-digit SIC code for 
transactions  in an industry. 
Source:  “Foreign  Direct Investment  in 
the United  States.” 
Natural  log of the value of shipments by 
industry in 1982. 
Source:  1982 Census of  Munufactures. 
Post-Tokyo  Round, 1986, nominal U.S. 
tariff rates. 
Source: Computer tape (Washington, 
D.C.: USITC, Office of Economic 
Research, May  1988). 
A dummy variable that takes on the value 
of  one if there exists a nontariff  barrier for 
that industry and zero otherwise. 
Source: USITC’s Industrial 
Characteristics and Trude Performance 
Data Bunk. 
Nontariff barrier dummy  x  Post-Tokyo 
Round tariffs in the United  States 
The effective protection rates were 
estimated by the USITC assuming fixed 
intermediate input-output coefficients. 
Source: USITC, Protection in Major 
Trading Counrries, Publication no. 737 
(Washington, D.C.: USITC, August  1975). 
Nontariff barrier dummy  x  U.S. effective 
tariff protection. 
Source: See individual variables listed. 
This is a dummy variable that takes on a 
value of  one for four-digit SIC industries 
2000-2199  and zero otherwise. 
This is a dummy variable that takes on a 
value of one for four-digit SIC industries 
2200-2399  and zero otherwise. 
A measure equal to: 
Source: Sec individual variables listed. 
((2 . [Min(IMPORT72,  EXPORT72)]}/ 
(IMPORT72 + EXPORT72)) . 100. 
Source: Data tape (Washington, D.C.: 75  Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment 
Midpoint plant size 
Research and development 
intensity 
Capital-labor ratio 
USITC, Office of Economic Research, 
1972). 
This variable is constructed from data 
reported  in the 1972 Census of 
Manufactures.  (A detailed description  is 
available from the author on request.) 
Percentage of  scientists and engineers in 
the work force of  an industry. 
Source: 1972 Census of  Manufactures. 
Gross book value  1972 divided by  labor 
employment 1972. 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
Annual Survey of  Manufactures,  1974, 
M74(A5)-I (Washington,  D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office,  1977). 
Notes 
1.  Recent empirical  work  on  outbound  U.S. foreign  direct  investment  includes 
Baldwin  (1979),  Grubaugh  (1987),  Kravis and  Lipsey  (1982),  Lipsey  and  Weiss 
(1 98  I), and Williamson (1986). Recent theoretical pieces more appropriately applied 
to outbound investments include Batra (1986), Chen (1985), Krugman (1979), and 
Wong (1987). 
2.  Earlier work focusing on the use of foreign direct investment to extract rents that 
would be difficult to capture through licenses includes Aliber (l970), Caves (l971), 
McGee (1966), and Vernon (1966). More recent work on contracting costs and the 
appropriability of rents includes Brecher (1982), Ethier (1986), Grossman and Hart 
(  1986), Helpman  ( 1984), Horstmann  and  Markusen  ( 1987), Rugman  ( 1980), and 
Williamson (1981). 
3. The possibility that trade restrictions may induce foreign direct investments is 
explored more fully in recent papers by  Brander and Spencer (1987), Chen (1985), 
Williamson (1986), and Wong (1987). 
4. The mean values of ownership control associated with foreign direct investments 
in  manufacturing in the United States for the regions considered here throughout the 
sample period were as follows: all countries, 86.34 percent; Japan, 86.57 percent; the 
EC, 87.85 percent; and Canada, 80.49 percent. 
5. In effect, 1 assume that M,  reflects additional costs to the parent firm of selling 
its product  in  a distant  market that  is  less well  known to  the  parent firm  than  its 
domestic  market.  Foreign  license  candidates  are  presumed  to  have  idiosyncratic 
information about their own markets. 
6. Early work that focused on the tariff-jumping aspects of foreign direct invest- 
ment  included  Horst  (1971,  1972a,  1972b). Papers  that  raised  the  possibility  of 
defensive  investment  included  Aliber  (l970),  Caves  (1971),  Gruber,  Mehta,  and 
Vernon (1967), Hymer (1976), Ray (1977), and Vernon (1966). 
7.  Monopoly and oligopoly models are embodied in papers dealing with foreign 
direct investment by Brander and Spencer (1987), Horstmann and Markusen (1987), 
and Levinsohn (1987), among others. 76  Edward John Ray 
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Comment  Keith E. Maskus 
This paper on foreign investment in the United States is ambitious in what it 
tries to do and in what it succeeds in doing. Ray has assembled a huge data 
base on individual  foreign  firms’  investment  decisions in the United  States 
over  the  period  1979-85  and  related  those  decisions,  aggregated  to  the 
industry level, to a large set of  U.S. industry characteristics, many of which 
will  be  familiar  to  those  who  have  read  his  papers  on  protection  and 
intraindustry  trade. Ray’s  intent  is  to  characterize the  various  motives  for 
foreign  direct  investment  in  the  United  States  across  a  broad  range  of 
manufacturing  and nonmanufacturing  industries,  though  his focus is clearly 
on manufacturing.  He has unearthed  some interesting regularities  in the data 
set, the  most  striking of  which  are that  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI) is 
concentrated in U.S. industries with a high research and development content 
and evidently is unrelated to heavy industry concentration. Further, more FDI 
is induced by a cheap dollar. These findings are useful and will help shape our 
understanding of  motivations for FDI coming into the United States. 
I wish to raise several questions about the analysis in the paper. The first 
issue  is  Ray’s  motivation  in  undertaking  this  research.  What  might  be 
Keith E. Maskus is associate professor of economics at the University of  Colorado, Boulder. 78  Edward .John  Rav 
different about FDI in the United States that would distinguish this paper from 
the enormous volume of  literature on other FDI flows, mainly  those flowing 
out of this country? To the extent that investment flows into the United States 
come  from  other  developed  countries  (and  clearly  the  overwhelmingly 
majority  do), it  is  difficult  to see  what  might  be  expected to characterize 
incentives for them  distinctly  from those driving  investment  in other direc- 
tions. A related issue is whether the situation in the United States has really 
changed in the  1980s in such a way as to attract not only more FDI but also 
a distinctive pattern of FDI, which, after all, has been coming into the United 
States in various degrees for a long time. 
These points do not  suggest  that  an  analysis  of  FDI entering the  United 
States is unimportant. There is much valuable information to be learned from 
such an exercise. It seems, though, that the paper would be strengthened by 
some consideration of what might be unique about the current U.S. market for 
absorbing  FDI. The paper hints at a proximate  answer by pointing out that 
FDI in the United States is diversified across several sectors and is certainly 
not dominated by manufactures.  This fact is especially true of Japanese FDI, 
which  is predominantly  in wholesale  trade or distribution  and banking  and 
finance. Are we to conclude from this that the U.S. service sector is peculiarly 
open to FDI? If  so, perhaps  foreign investors are positioning  themselves to 
exploit  a  clear  U.S.-based  comparative advantage in  supplying  U.S.  and 
foreign markets? But I suppose one might as easily ask whether manufactur- 
ing is peculiarly closed to FDI in comparison with other countries. And, more 
generally, some reference could be made to specific characteristics of the U.S. 
economy  in  the  aggregate-its  large  size  and  proximity  to another major 
market,  Canada,  come  to  mind,  along  with  putatively  more  flexible  ap- 
proaches  to  labor-market  adjustments,  environmental regulation,  and  the 
like-that  might attract or repel FDI in the United States differently from FDI 
elsewhere. A final intriguing possibility might be that burgeoning FDI in the 
United States in the  1980s may  reflect not only exchange rate changes and 
growth rates, as indicated in the paper, but also a readjustment to the postwar 
disequilibrium  distribution  of  the global capital stock. The view  that  inter- 
national firms are accumulating their desired capital distributions in the United 
States, if accurate, would have rather distinctive implications for the ongoing, 
somewhat  paranoid  debate about  the  future status of  this  country  as  a  net 
debtor. 
A  second  issue concerns aspects of  the  model  that  Ray  puts  forward  to 
explain the investmentilicensing  decision. All economists have their favored 
arguments to insert into objective functions or optimization problems, and so 
it is perhaps unfair to complain about any particular omission here. However, 
I was surprised to see essentially no discussion of FDI as a risk-management 
technique, something that is presumably  central to the investment decision. 
We know, for example, that currency risks can either expand or curtail FDI. 
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the 1980s. It would be difficult to measure industry-specific currency risks (let 
alone other international  risks) for the empirical  work, so this exclusion  is 
understandable.  However, it is feasible to develop some aggregate measures 
of risk to use in conjunction with the other variables of an aggregate nature, 
such as  economic  growth. Several measures  of  bilateral  real  and nominal 
exchange-rate volatility have been established  in the literature. 
A  further  modeling  issue  relates  to  the  assumption  of  monopolistic 
competition, implying a high degree of competition and reasonably free entry. 
This is done essentially  for convenience, forgoing the need  to worry about 
strategic interactions among domestic and foreign competitors. But strategic 
rivalry  may  be  precisely  the  issue  in  explaining much  FDI.  What  prior 
evidence we have is that firms that become multinational tend to be large firms 
at  home  and  abroad.  It  can  be  argued  that  FDI  may  require  significant 
departures from competition  to generate sufficient profits  to overcome the 
disadvantages of operating a subsidiary in a foreign market. The issue then 
becomes an empirical one. Ray finds that the consumer-goods nature of  an 
industry is unrelated to FDI. Perhaps more  significant is his discovery  that 
industry  concentration  within  the  United  States  apparently  provides  no 
independent  motivation  for FDI,  or perhaps  even a  negative  one, arguing 
against the strategic-rivalry hypothesis. These results are sufficiently strong as 
to give pause to enthusiasts of  oligopoly-based  theories of  FDI. However,  I 
doubt  their  conclusiveness. For  example,  concentration  is  a  barrier  to all 
entry, including FDI, so it is unsurprising to find no relation between them. 
Such a finding does not  necessarily  mean that  there are no subtle strategic 
interactions  surrounding  the  entry  decision  itself  or  even  that  industry 
concentration  within  the  United  States is  the  best  way  to approach that 
question empirically. Further work might consider this issue more completely. 
I turn finally to some of the empirical issues in the paper. First, because all 
the industry-specific explanatory variables are measured with U.S. data, FDI 
is  related  to  U.S.  industry  characteristics  alone.  This effort  is important 
because  we  are interested  in  the particulars of  local  competition  that  may 
attract or repel foreign investment.  But, by not considering also the charac- 
teristics of  the home-country environment, we may be missing a substantial 
part of  the description of determinants of FDI. Of course, this latter approach 
would require the assembly of  industry characteristics  in other countries as 
well, an enormous task that might be feasible only on a much more limited set 
of data.  Furthermore, I  note the significant finding in the paper that FDI is 
stronger within industries than across industries,  so the omission of foreign 
data may not be serious to the extent that parent-country characteristics mirror 
those in the United States. 
A second empirical question relates to Ray’s efforts to investigate the links 
between FDI and trade barriers  in order to examine the various hypotheses 
surrounding  those  links:  tariff  jumping  and  quid pro quo investment, for 
example. I  doubt that  these questions  have been  given a fair hearing here, 80  Edward John Ray 
simply because the timing of  the data used is suspect. Though tariff rates are 
from 1986, the effective protection rates and nontariff barriers are taken from 
the  International  Trade Commission’s data  bank, which  lists trade  barriers 
from 1970 or the post-Kennedy  Round era. The FDI flows, however, are for 
a much  more recent period,  meaning that more recent measures of  effective 
protection and nontariff trade barriers (abstracting from the prior issue of how 
even to measure such barriers) would be more appropriate. It strains things 
somewhat to claim that the obvious rise in nontariff trade barriers in the 1980s 
is unrelated to FDI when the data on trade barriers are so old. The difficulty 
is  perhaps  especially  relevant  for  assessing  the  extent  of  quid  pro  quo 
investment,  in  which  FDI  is  supposed  to  come  before  policy  decisions 
regarding  trade  interventions  (and to deter such interventions),  so that  the 
timing is, in a crucial sense, just opposite that  in the empirical  work. And, 
evidently, issues of  simultaneity would arise as well in considering more fully 
the link between trade barriers and investment flows. 
Finally, I conclude with two observations about empirical results that I find 
intriguing.  First, there appears to be some difference between the manufac- 
turing industries in which Japanese FDI is concentrated and other countries’ 
FDI. The Japanese are less interested in capital-intensive  industries (suggest- 
ing, under Ray’s conception, that Japanese FDI embodies lower amounts of 
specialized physical-capital assets, though,  strictly from an empirical view, I 
wonder how well proxied that variable is by a simple capital-labor ratio) and 
are  insensitive  to exchange-rate changes in  pursuing  FDI  (though  in  that 
regard there may well be lags that might usefully be identified in a time-series 
analysis). This unique Japanese performance seems potentially interesting in 
the face of widespread concern in the United States over incoming investment 
and might usefully  be explored  further. 
Second, I note that Ray finds no relation between  intraindustry  trade and 
incoming FDI. Still open, however,  is the question of  intraindustry  invest- 
ment. Are there any unique determinants of such investment (which cannot be 
explored with this data set) that have not been captured in existing models of 
FDI, and how can they be pursued empirically? 
Comment  James Levinsohn 
The paper is a much-needed attempt to get some empirical handle on just what 
causes inward foreign direct investment (FDI). The author has used a rich data 
source-FD1  by firms at the four-digit SIC level to address an important and 
current real-world policy concern. This sort of work is often time consuming, 
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and it is nice to see someone dig in and search for what answers may lie out 
there in the data. In preparing my comments, I have tried to keep in mind what 
I think is the primary goal of the paper-to  shed some light on what is behind 
inward FDI. My comments, then, are primarily directed at what the results of 
the paper may or may not tell us. 
The comments on the paper fall into three categories. I  will  first briefly 
discuss the theory presented in the paper. Second, I will raise some concerns 
about  the  data used  for the estimation  section  of  the paper.  Third,  I  wi!l 
mention a few issues related to the estimation procedure itself. 
The paper begins with a model of FDI in manufacturing.  I have two fairly 
broad comments on this section of  the paper. The first may just be a matter of 
semantics. I think of an economic model as an analytic setup in which, in this 
case, firms maximize  profits  subject to various  constraints  imposed  by  the 
economic environment in which they operate. Standard operating procedure is 
to characterize the optimum and then perform some sort of comparative statics 
exercises  to  see  how  firms  adapt  to  a  small  change  in  their  economic 
environment.  With luck, one can sign these changes-which  are frequently 
the net effect of many interacting variables-and  derive predictions about the 
signs of  coefficients in an estimating equation. An example along these lines 
with respect  to FDI in a very different and much simpler context is a paper 
eleven years ago by Ray in the Journal of  Political  Economy (Ray 1977). 
The model in the paper is not like this. There is no explicit optimization, 
nor  is the interaction of  myriad economic influences on FDI explicitly  laid 
out.  Rather,  the  reader  is  presented  with  what  amounts to  reduced-form 
equations in  which  the expected signs  on various  arguments  are stated  as 
intuition. That intuition, I want to stress, usually seems right to me. One issue 
raised  by  formalizing  intuition  about  net  results  rather  than  laying  out the 
structure  behind  the  intuition  is  that  it is  hard  to know  what  the  policy 
implications  of  the results  actually are.  On occasion, though, the author’s 
intuition  is  not  obvious to me.  An  example here  is  the  assumption  that 
specialized capital and labor are more easily appropriable by the owner over 
time through licenses than if they are embodied in physical capital (i.e., FDI). 
Maybe, and maybe not. It is not obvious to me and would seem to depend on 
agency issues. 
My other comment about the model concerns its relevance to the empirical 
work that is intended to motivate. The discussion in this section of the paper 
is directed at whether a foreign firm decides to compete in the home market 
via FDI or via a licensing arrangement.  It is assumed that for some reason the 
foreign firm cannot compete in the home market by just exporting. My hunch 
is that this is indeed how most international competition takes place. Still, the 
assumption  may  be right if  there  are prohibitive  trade taxes.  Yet,  although 
such taxes show up in the estimating equation, they are assumed away in the 
model  itself.  Other  potentially  key  variables  that  show  up  in  estimated 
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market structure. Another variable that is in the estimating equation but not in 
the model is the exchange rate. The intuition expressed here is that the foreign 
firm will be more likely to take the plunge and invest via FDI when there is 
a known to be temporary decline in the domestic exchange rate. The only role 
exchange rates play in the discussion is that they act like a large sign reading 
“bargain  days this  month.”  It  may  be  that  exchange rates should enter a 
model of  FDI, but it is not clear that this is the only way. If firms know that 
an exchange rate is temporarily  undervalued,  it would seem that they could 
gain from this information by buying the cheap currency and later selling it for 
a  higher  price,  and  this  story  is independent  of  FDI.  (Indeed, with  well- 
functioning financial futures and options markets  in foreign exchange, it is 
unclear what FDI can accomplish that arbitrage cannot.) The point of  this is 
that  how exchange rates  enter the picture  depends on the  structure  of  the 
problem, and this is not presented in the paper. 
The punchline here is that I think most readers, as the author does, believe 
that variables such as market structure and exchange rates matter, but, without 
some sort of economic model of how they matter, it is difficult to interpret the 
results. 
I would like next to raise a few questions about how to interpret the results, 
given the data used. 
I have one fairly minor and one less minor qualm about the relation between 
the data set used  and  the economic questions  addressed. To raise  the  less 
major point first, the discussion in the modeling section of the paper clearly 
implies that the transactions that did not occur (which are represented by zeros 
in  the  probit  regressions)  were  instead  licensing  arrangements. Is  this  the 
case? If not (as one might suspect), perhaps either the modeling section of the 
paper should be amended or more appropriate data should be utilized. 
More important, the variables for research and development, nontariff trade 
barriers,  effective rates  of  protection,  plant size, and capital-to-labor  ratios 
play a key role in the story that the author discusses. It is only natural, then, 
that  they  should  be  in  an  estimated  equation  investigating  foreign  direct 
investment from 1979 to 1985. Yet the variables for research and development 
intensity, the capital-to-labor ratio, and plant size are from 1972, according to 
table notes.  The nontariff trade barrier variable  is from 1975. Explaining  a 
firm’s investment decision by the economic environment it in part faced four 
to  thirteen  years  ago, if  the firm  was even in  business  then, creates  some 
problems when we try to interpret the results. 
If these variables do not change over time or change proportionately across 
industries and over time, then this is not likely to be a problem.  But implicit 
in using a time-series cross section is that the variables  do vary  over time. 
How important is this issue likely to be? 
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suspect,  perhaps  make  a  big  difference.  Use  of  nontariff  trade  barriers  is 
widely thought  to have increased  dramatically over the last fifteen years.  It 
also seems that, while aggregate capital-to-labor ratios may not have moved 
a lot, at the four-digit level they probably did. The same story applies to the 
research and development variable. 
I am left wondering how to interpret the results of equations that examine 
how today's investment decision is affected by economic conditions of, on the 
average, a decade earlier. 
The last set of issues that I want to raise has to do  with how some econometric 
concerns may affect our interpretation of the paper. 
Let us assume that the data set is a panel and that therefore there is variation 
over time in addition to variation over firms. It seems reasonable that some of 
the variables that are not in the estimating equation may be quite correlated 
with time. This would argue for inclusion of  fixed effects in the model. This 
could be done by just including year dummies in the estimated equations when 
Tobit was used.  It is a simple procedure and would use only five degrees of 
freedom.  It  may,  though, change the  results.  It seems worth trying.  This 
simple procedure is not going to work for the probit regressions, though, as 
the estimates would be inconsistent. 
Another point concerns sensitivity analysis. There is none. Especially since 
the functional form and choice of which variables to include are fairly ad hoc, 
it would be nice to convince the reader that the results are robust to the choices 
actually made. There is a side benefit to this that relates to the interpretation 
of results. The paper does not attempt to say anything about the magnitude of 
the  results.  The  reader  is  left  wondering  whether  the  effects  of  various 
influences  on the  FDI decision  are  quantitatively  important  and how  they 
compare with  one another.  If  the Tobit regressions  were estimated  without 
using  the  zero  observations  using  a  log-linear  functional  form, we  could 
interpret the coefficients as elasticities  and would avoid the problem of  not 
being able to compare effects measured in different units. This might help our 
interpretation of the results. 
To  summarize,  the  paper  addresses  an  important  policy  issue.  It  is 
heartening to see empirical research on this timely topic. In the end, though, 
I was left wondering about the interpretation of some of  the results. 
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